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 Formal and Informal Care 
in the Public and Private Spheres 
in England and Australia 
 BRIAN  SLOAN * 
 I. Introduction: Th e Conundrum of Space 
and Formal, Informal, Public and Private Care 
 Any attempt to distinguish between public and private spheres as spaces of care 
gives rise to immediate diffi  culties. Th is is true not least because it is necessary also to 
distinguish between formal care, provided pursuant to a contractual or other legal 
duty, and informal care, provided in the absence of such a duty. For example, while 
formal social care tends to be associated with public responsibility and the state, 
in England  ‘ few local authorities are now involved in the direct delivery of care 
and support services ’, with most services operated by private, for-profi t providers 
(Kelly 2013: 24). 1 Much formal care takes place in private homes, and such homes 
and other private property can be appropriated to fund the social care system. 
Moreover, privacy must be an important value in the context of a care home that 
might in other respects be characterised as public (Hughes 2004). Conversely, the 
recognition of, not to mention reliance on,  informal care (which might legitimately 
be characterised as a matter of private arrangement, albeit inherently informal) by 
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  2  National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1). 
  3  National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1)(a). 
  4  National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1)(b). 
  5  National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(4). 
the state arguably gives it a public character, and the social care system on occa-
sion turns informal carers into care workers through mechanisms such as direct 
payments (Ungerson 2004). Th ere is also an important distinction between public 
and private  law , with the former encompassing claims against the state by one 
or more individuals and the latter encompassing claims by one or more private 
individuals against another such individual or group. Th e concepts of public and 
private therefore cut across the economy of care. 
 Mindful of these diffi  culties, this chapter will focus on the relationship between 
formal (associated with the public sphere) and informal (associated with the 
private sphere) care in England and Australia, in terms of their legal recognition 
and funding. It will highlight the fact that, while both formal systems have recently 
moved towards limiting the liability of care recipients to pay for their formal care 
(albeit very tentatively in England), several parts of Australia have been much 
more willing to facilitate the rational recognition of informal caring relationships 
in  private law than has been the case in England, with the result that property 
transfers can be mandated between care recipients (generally via their estates) and 
informal carers. Th e chapter will consider whether approaches to the funding of 
 formal care can be squared with the recognition of informal care in private law. 
 II. Formal Care 
 A. England 
 Adult social care is the responsibility of local authorities in England. While it 
lacks a statutory defi nition, it has been said that it  ‘ supports people of all ages 
with certain physical, cognitive or age-related conditions in carrying out personal 
care or domestic routines ’ (Commission on Funding of Care and Support 
2011: 4). It is distinct from health care provided by the National Health Service 
(NHS), which is designed to  ‘ secure improvement ’ 2  ‘ in the physical and mental 
health of the people of England ’ 3 and  ‘ in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment 
of physical and mental illness ’. 4 Th is distinction assumes particular importance as 
regards the funding of care, but is frequently criticised (Herring 2016: 54). 
 Th e charging regimes for health care and social care have been separate since 
the beginnings of the NHS (Bilton 2014: 14). Th e National Health Service Act 2006 
mandates that  ‘ [t]he services provided as part of the health service in England 
must be free of charge ’ except where legislation expressly provides otherwise. 5 
Formal and Informal Care in the Public and Private Spheres 119
  6  Care Act 2014, ss 9 – 13. 
  7  Care and Support (Charging and Assessment of Resources) Regulations, SI 2014/2672, made 
under Care Act 2014, ss 14 and 17, inter alia. 
  8  See National Health Service Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups 
 (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) Regulations SI 2012/2996, Part 6. 
By contrast, however, the Dilnot Commission on the Funding of Care and Support 
(2011: 11) explained that  ‘ [v]ery broadly, under [the social care] system, people 
with assets over  £ 23,250 receive no fi nancial state support and need to fund their 
own care ’ and  ‘ [t]he level and type of state support for people with assets below 
this threshold depends on their needs and income ’. A care recipient ’ s liability to 
pay is assessed by a local authority (separately to a needs assessment) 6 using an 
extremely complex set of regulations to determine the existence of  relevant  capital 
and income. 7 Baxter (2016) estimated that in the recent past between 20  and 
25  per  cent of those receiving care in their own homes, and between 43  and 
45 per cent of those doing so in a care home, paid for their own care, as well as 
predicting future increases in those fi gures. 
 Th e starkness of the funding diff erences is not, however, refl ected in the 
distinction between the types of care (Spencer-Lane 2015: [1 – 268]). Th ere is also 
controversy over NHS Continuing Healthcare: 
 [A] package of ongoing care  … arranged and funded solely by the [NHS] for individu-
als outside a hospital setting who have complex ongoing healthcare needs, of a type 
or quantity such that they  … have a  ‘ primary health need ’  … as a result of disability, 
accident or illness (Department of Health 2018: [15.33]). 8 
 Th e King ’ s Fund (2014: 3) describes NHS Continuing Healthcare (with its very 
stringent criteria) as involving an  ‘ all or nothing ’ assessment, whereby those who 
pass it receive free care and accommodation. 
 Mayhew and Smith (2014: 670 – 71) emphasise that  ‘ [a]  … system for funding 
social care  … along similar lines to the NHS  … would involve a combination of 
higher taxes, more borrowing and/or redirecting public fi nances from other prior-
ity areas ’, at a time of a perceived need for austerity and in which local authorities 
are already struggling to meet demands (Age UK 2016) and the dignity of those 
who require care is far from guaranteed, whatever the rhetoric surrounding the 
introduction of the Care Act 2014 (Sloan 2016). Even so, the King ’ s Fund (2014: vi) 
asserts that pressures in health and social care and the needs of an ageing 
 population  ‘ call for a response that goes well beyond patching up existing services 
and making the changes set out in the Dilnot report [involving the capping of 
liability] ’. Th e Fund makes the bold claim that  ‘ higher public spending on health 
and social care is aff ordable if it is phased in over a decade ’ and recommend that it 
be funded  ‘ through tax and national insurance increases, reallocating funds from 
other areas of spending, and changes to prescription charges ’. For the time being, 
however, the marked distinction between the funding arrangements for health and 
social care looks set to stay. 
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  9  National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations SI 1992/2977, r 28(1). 
  10  Care Act 2014, s 15. 
  11  Care Act 2014, s 16. 
 Th e charging and funding regime in the Care Act 2014 was nevertheless 
 ‘ intended to make charging fairer and more clearly understood by everyone ’ 
(Department of Health 2018: [8.2]). Hopkins and Laurie (2015: 112) describe it as 
 ‘ a signifi cant rebalancing of the individual-state relationship in terms of respon-
sibility for funding  … social care, whilst maintaining the underlying model of 
funding through both individual and state contributions ’. 
 Under the regime that would have been introduced via the Care Act 2014, 
based somewhat on the Dilnot Commission ’ s proposals but then delayed by the 
Government until 2020 before being scrapped (BBC News 2017), people with 
assets of  £ 118,000 (where the person ’ s home is included in the fi nancial assess-
ment; the fi gure was  £ 27,000 otherwise) would start to receive help with care 
costs (Department of Health 2015: [9.7]).  £ 17,000 would have been the new lower 
limit of the means test below which no contribution will be expected from the 
individual (Department of Health 2015: [9.8]), increased from  £ 14,250. 9 
 Th e lifetime cap on an individual ’ s social care contributions was a central 
aspect of the Dilnot proposals and the Act. 10 It was expected to be  £ 72,000 for 
those developing eligible care needs aft er the age of 25 if it was fi rst introduced in 
April 2016 (Department of Health 2015: [10.2]), and it would have been adjusted 
annually to account for infl ation. 11 Th e eff ect of the cap would have been limited, 
however. Even before its implementation was delayed, the King ’ s Fund (2014: 3) 
emphasised that only the cost of meeting  eligible needs would count towards 
the cap, which are likely to be critical or substantial and not low or moderate. 
Th ere was also concern that progress towards the cap could be set below what 
it costs  an individual to pay for care (Department of Health 2015:  chapter 4 ) 
because the local authority could secure cheaper provision itself (Spencer-Lane 
2015 [1 – 317]). It should also be emphasised that the cap would exclude so-called 
 ‘ general ’ or  ‘ daily ’  ‘ living costs ’ within a care home, and these were expected to be 
set at around  £ 12,000 per year (Department of Health 2015: [7.3]; Fern á ndez and 
Nadash 2016). Th ese limitations on the cap would have left  many people paying 
a considerable sum towards their care even if the cap were brought into eff ect 
(Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 2015). For example, the Institute and Faculty of 
Actuaries (2014) has estimated that those who reached the cap would have spent 
an average of  £ 140,000 before doing so, and that only around 10 per cent of those 
who pay for care would ever reach it (Independent Age and Institute and Faculty 
of Actuaries 2017). As a consequence, it recommends an inclusive  £ 100,000 cap 
that includes the local authority rate, daily living costs and  ‘ excess ’ top-up fees 
based on average care costs. 
 Aside from the cap, a major area of funding reform within the Care Act relates 
to the off ering of deferred payment agreements (DPAs), allowing the payment of 
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  12  Th e DPA prima facie falls due for repayment 90 days aft er the person ’ s death or on disposal of 
property on which the local authority has a charge: Department of Health (2018: [9.108]; Care and 
Support (Deferred Payment) Regulations SI 2014/2671, r 7. 
  13  Th ey therefore propose Personal Care Savings Bonds. 
social care costs to be deferred (via a secured loan) until a point such as the death 
of the care recipient or the sale of her home. 12 
 Th e Government hoped that a market in insurance products would develop 
once the cap came into eff ect, to help people pay for care (Department of Health 
2014). Th e King ’ s Fund (2014: vi), however, claimed that there were  ‘ no signs ’ 
that such a market would develop. Mayhew and Smith (2014: 670) express 
concern that  ‘ [i]f spending by the state and by the individual does not keep 
pace with need,  … the quality and availability of care will suff er unless there are 
better mechanisms to help people support themselves ’. 13 An extra  £ 2 billion for 
social care was pledged by the Chancellor in 2017, and a further  £ 150 million 
was announced by his successor the following year, but there are concerns that 
this remains insuffi  cient to improve the level of care appropriately and cope with 
increased demand (Campbell 2017; Walker 2018). 
 Th e future of the funding of social care remains in doubt following the 
2017 general election. In fact, the Conservative manifesto (Conservatives 2017) 
proposed to remove the  ‘ disregard ’ preventing a person ’ s home being included in 
the assessment where she is to receive care in her own home. Th e objective was 
said to be increasing fairness in the system while also assisting it to cope with 
increased demands as a result of the ageing population. Th is would have meant 
some people currently receiving free care being expected to pay for it in future, but 
would have been off set by an increase in the current  £ 23,250 threshold to  £ 100,000 
(which local authorities have indicated they are unable to aff ord: Elgot 2017). Th e 
aim was expressed to be to ensure that self-funders would have  £ 100,000 to pass 
on via inheritance. Th e cap was not mentioned in the manifesto at all, although 
the then Prime Minister Th eresa May later indignantly asserted that there would 
be such a cap without specifying what it would be (Asanthana 2017). Following 
the Conservatives ’ failure to secure an overall majority in the House of Commons, 
the Queen ’ s Speech (HM Government 2017) covered social care in a rather  ‘ light 
touch ’ manner: all that is really known is that proposals will be brought forward 
for consultation via a Green Paper, which will apparently not now be published 
until autumn 2018 (Jarrett 2018). It was announced in December 2017 that the cap 
planned for 2020 would not be brought forward, albeit that some form of limita-
tion on liability to pay is still apparently planned (BBC News 2017). 
 Th e reality is that, pending any further reform, a signifi cant portion of the 
population in England will have to pay a considerable sum towards their care, not 
least since the average annual cost of a care home in December 2017 was exceeding 
 £ 40,000 if nursing care is necessary (Paying for Care). Th is could have signifi -
cant implications for any recognition of informal care in private law, discussed in 
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the next section. More broadly, it perpetuates a form of discrimination between 
people with diff erent types of care need, even if that is not actionable, and can 
produce situations where the system fails fully to meet the needs of a social care 
recipient in a manner consistent with her dignity, and charges her catastrophically 
for the privilege of enduring that failure (Sloan 2016). Th e potential  undesirability 
of the extent of the current  ‘ user pays ’ principle must, however, be seen in the 
context of the fact that any reduction in the amount going into the system might 
prejudice its ability to meet the needs of those who genuinely cannot aff ord to pay 
for their care, particularly since a considerable care funding shortfall for the future 
has already been predicted. Th e next sub-section analyses the funding of formal 
social care in Australia. 
 B. Australia 
 Australia is dealing with similar demographic issues to England, and an inde-
pendent report (Tune 2017: 7) has said that  ‘ there is a need for more high-level 
care at home ’ and that  ‘ meeting projected future demand will need additional 
investment by government beyond that currently planned ’. Th ere is a broadly 
similar distinction in Australia as compared to England between health and social 
care, comprising a  ‘ user pays ’ principle in respect of social care. Th e King ’ s Fund 
( Robertson et al 2014: 17) explains that,  ‘ [a]s in England, the Australian social 
care system is not universal and government assistance focuses on those with low 
incomes ’, with  ‘ [a] range of services  … off ered by national and local government ’. 
Again as in England, wealthier people oft en pay the full cost of their care out of 
pocket, up to the government-defi ned limit, and it is diffi  cult to buy private insur-
ance to cover these costs (ibid: 18; Lacey 2014). In contrast to the English emphasis 
on deferred payment agreements, however, the Australian Government chose not 
to  ‘ support ’ a recommendation for   ‘  the introduction of a government-backed 
scheme to enable consumers to draw on the equity in their home to pay their aged 
care costs ’ (Tune 2017: 70). 
 As regards residential care,  ‘ individuals make a means-tested contribution to 
their care costs, and pay accommodation costs and daily living expenses them-
selves ’, with regulations setting out  ‘ a maximum amount each person can be 
charged for accommodation, based on their assets, and a maximum daily living 
charge ’ (Robertson et al 2014: 17 – 18). Carney (2014: 23) has said that  ‘ [r]esidential 
aged care is a small but very expensive sub-set of Australian aged care services ’, and 
it is signifi cant that  ‘ the majority of aged care funding is provided by government ’ 
with just under a quarter provided by consumers (Tune 2017: 89). All care home 
residents can be expected to pay  ‘ a basic daily fee equivalent to 85 per cent of the 
basic single age pension ’ (Aged Care Financing Authority 2017: 18). Th at is all that 
is payable for people whose income and assets are below a certain level, but only 
18.8 per cent of care home residents were otherwise fully supported in June 2016 
and 55.4 per cent were classed as  ‘ non-supported ’ (ibid: 21). It should also be 
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  14  cf Tune (2017: 19) on Victoria and Western Australia. 
noted that  ‘ [h]ome care for the elderly is provided through the Commonwealth 
Home Support Program ’ and that  ‘ [s]ubsidies are income-tested and may require 
copayments from recipients ’ (Glover). 14 
 Signifi cantly for our purposes, Australia has also undertaken a capping process 
for care via amendments to the Aged Care Act 1997 made by the Aged Care (Living 
Longer Living Better) Act 2013, making for an interesting comparison. Th e appro-
priateness of the comparison continues in the next sub-section, since England 
and Australia share a common law heritage that combines a default principle of 
testamentary freedom with the possibility of court applications for discretionary 
provision out of an estate, albeit that Australian States and Territories recognise 
care much more explicitly within that system. 
 It has been said that the aim of the  ‘ living longer, living better ’ programme 
embodied in the Australian 2013 Act is  ‘ to build a better, fairer, more sustainable 
and more nationally consistent aged care system ’ (Trurong 2013). In the aged care 
reforms, there is 
 a strong emphasis to make it easier for older Australians to stay in their home while they 
receive care and a removal of the distinction between low and high aged care services, 
along with a tighter means test to assess home care and residential care fees (ibid). 
 Th ere are fears that  ‘ part-pensioners and self-funded retirees may end up paying 
higher fees ’ (ibid), the latter of which is clearly refl ected in England. But in Australia 
there is now (as of July 2018) both an annual cap of  $ 26,964.71 and a lifetime cap of 
 $ 64,715.36 (Department of Health (Australia) 2018). Th ose capping arrangements 
are applicable to all residents entering into permanent residential aged care on 
or aft er 1 July 2014, but there also appears to be an equivalent lifetime cap in the 
 income -tested care fee for those receiving care in their own homes and a variable 
annual cap (Tune 2017: 84). It is signifi cant that the lifetime cap  (approximately 
 £ 35,770.12 on the July 2018 value) is similar to the cap suggested by the Dilnot 
Commission in England, and superfi cially much lower than the  £ 72,000 origi-
nally suggested by the Government there. Signifi cantly,  ‘ [n]either basic daily 
fees nor accommodation costs are counted towards the annual and lifetime caps ’ 
(ibid), displaying similar limitations likely to be applied to any cap likely to be 
implemented in England. Again similarly to England, only a small percentage of 
permanent residents (specifi cally 5 – 6 per cent) are expected to reach the cap in 
Australia (ibid). 
 Th ere is now a combined asset and income test for those in residential care 
in Australia (Tune 2017: 72). McCullagh (2014: 71) also asserts that  ‘ most ordi-
nary assets are included ’ in a residential care assessment,  ‘ but not the value of the 
former home if still occupied by a partner (or certain carers or relatives) when 
entering care ’. Occupation by certain people can cause the home to be disregarded 
in England (Sloan 2017), although it has been seen that the extent to which it 
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  15  Health Insurance Act 1973; Minford (2001). 
  16  National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013. 
  17  See further National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013, s 22. 
should be disregarded in relation to domiciliary care has been the subject of much 
political debate there. In Australia, only income (and not capital assets, except 
when deemed to be income) are assessed for the purposes of domiciliary care, 
and Tune (2017: 71) described this as  ‘ appropriate ’, since the inclusion of the 
home might jeopardise the care recipient ’ s ability to remain in it and thwart a 
key purpose of the Act. It seems that the value of the home to be counted in the 
assessment is largely capped at  $ 165,271.20 (as of July 2018) in Australia where 
included (Department of Health (Australia) 2018), although Tune (2017: 80) 
recommended that the full value be included (where it is not excluded by virtue 
of a  ‘ protected person ’ ). 
 While there are signifi cant similarities between social care in England and 
Australia, not least that both are subject to a means test and are distinct from 
health care, more health care appears to be subject to patient contributions in 
Australia by virtue of the Medicare system. 15 As Carney (2014: 19 – 20) puts it, 
 ‘Australia operates a publicly funded, universal system of medical benefi ts known 
as  Medicare, principally funded by the federal government ’, albeit via a levy 
imposed on taxpayers in a certain income bracket. Medicare  ‘ reimburses medical 
providers a  “ scheduled fee ” component of medical costs, and funds state and terri-
tory governments under a cost-sharing agreement to provide hospitals and other 
infrastructure ’. Th e percentage of the fee reimbursed varies according to the cost 
and type of medical treatment. 
 Conversely, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) could be an 
important source of support in Australia. 16 Th e scheme, piloted in 2013 by the 
federal Government in partnership with States, seeks to  ‘ provide more-fl exible 
funding support (not means-tested), allowing greater tailoring of services ’ 
(Glover). Th e aim of the NDIS is to  ‘ provide no-fault insurance cover for 
Australians who are born with or acquire a severe or profound disability ’ (Green 
and Mears 2014: 25). One description is that  ‘ [u]nder the NDIS, anyone under 
the age of 65 and with a disability that is permanent, or likely to become perma-
nent, and signifi cant will be eligible for the NDIS, ’ subject to immigration status 
(Cebulla and Zhu 2016: 257). 17 Funding for the NDIS was provided by an increase 
in the Medicare levy (Walsh and Johnson 2013). 
 Windholz (2014: 89) has said that the NDIS  ‘ revolutionises the provision of 
services to persons with disabilities ’, and that  ‘ [t]he cornerstone of the scheme  … 
is the provision to persons with disabilities of greater choice and control over the 
support they receive ’. Th e system appears similar to NHS Continuing Healthcare, 
albeit on a more generous scale, with an emphasis on personalisation. 
 It therefore seems that there is an attempt to distinguish age- from disability-
related care in Australia, more so than within England. Wark (2015: 93 – 96) 
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asserts that  ‘ the issue of ageing with a disability does not appear to have been 
 appropriately considered in the  … NDIS legislation ’, such that  ‘ [t]here remains a 
divide between aged-care support options predominantly funded by the Common-
wealth  Government and disability services auspiced through the various states ’. 
He asserts that 
 [u]nder the NDIS legislation, individuals with disability who are ageing will be able to 
maintain their disability support programs or can convert to the mainstream aged-care 
support model once they reach 65 years of age, but the policy framework indicates that 
a person must choose one system or the other, as supplementary funding support to 
address emerging needs associated with ageing is not possible. 
 He thus claims that  ‘ [t]he integration between the social and healthcare systems 
in the UK and Ireland was better managed than in Australia ’, although it has been 
seen that the relationship between the NHS and social care has created signifi cant 
issues. Th ere are fears that 
 [t]he introduction of the  … NDIS  … with its principle of entitlement to services based 
on need means that specialist disability services may be more freely available to younger 
people than to older Australians (those aged 65 or older) with the same disability and 
need. (National Aged Care Alliance, 2016: 5) 
 Similarly to the situation in England, 
 [t]he diff erent roles and responsibility for medical, ageing and disability related aids and 
equipment continues to confuse consumers, whose eligibility, access and out-of-pocket 
costs will diff er depending on where they live, their age and which service system they 
are able to access. (ibid: 28) 
 Whatever the diff erences of detail, there are thus a number of common themes 
within the Australian and English systems: means-tested social care systems in 
broad contrast to health care systems, with wealthy people expected to contrib-
ute signifi cant amounts to their care, credible allegations of discrimination and 
inequity of provision within the system, and an attempt to personalise services 
(Glover). Th e common feature that will form the background of the remainder 
of this chapter, however, is the sense that there should be some limitation on the 
amount that any individual should be expected to pay for her formal care, even if 
this feature is in some doubt in England, and even though Tune (2017: 9) when 
reviewing the Australian 2013 Act recommended that  ‘ the annual and lifetime 
caps for fees should be abolished ’ to  ‘ ensure that consumers contribute to the costs 
of their care commensurate with both their care needs and relative fi nancial capac-
ity ’. He was concerned that  ‘ [t]he caps limit the amount that wealthier consumers 
contribute to their care costs, aft er which taxpayers eff ectively subsidise the full 
cost of their care ’ (ibid: 84), albeit that in England such arguments have been met 
with objections relating to the possibility that catastrophic costs will be imposed 
on some people and that discrimination will operate between those who require 
diff erent types of care. Th e next section will consider the recognition of  informal 
care in  private law. 
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 III. Informal Care 
 A. England 
 Despite the existence of a social care system, there are around 5.8 million infor-
mal carers in England and Wales (Offi  ce for National Statistics 2013). Such carers 
vitally provide support to elderly and disabled people in the absence of a contrac-
tual or other legal duty to do so, 18 and the majority of elderly people receiving care 
in their own homes do so from family members (Pickard 2015). Th e reasons for 
this are likely to include the social care system being unable to provide the required 
support, the costs associated with social care (discussed in the last section), 
and resistance to leaving one ’ s home and/or  ‘ offi  cial ’ involvement in one ’ s care 
(Sloan 2013:  chapter 1 ). Th e Government seems to have accepted that some 
responsibility for care should, or at least will inevitably, rest with family members 
(Swinford 2017; Sloan 2015; Conservatives 2017: 60), particularly in the aft ermath 
of the much-anticipated  ‘ Brexit ’ (Allegretti 2018). 
 Such carers do have some recognition in public law (Herring 2013), despite the 
fact that their work may well be located in the  ‘ private ’ sphere because of its nature. 
Th e Care Act 2014, for example, created  ‘ the fi rst ever entitlement to support for 
carers ’ (Department of Health 2014a). My previous work, however, has considered 
the extent to which carers do or should nevertheless have a claim against the prop-
erty and/or estate of a care recipient in recognition of their eff orts and the fi scal 
and health disadvantages that they suff er (Sloan 2013 and 2015), and an aim of 
this chapter is to assess whether such a claim is appropriate in light of the possible 
moves towards limiting liability of care recipients to pay for  formal care. Th is will 
be placed in the context of the wide recognition of caring relationships in Austral-
ian private law, addressed in the next sub-section. 
 Proprietary estoppel is an equitable doctrine that has been used to facilitate 
claims by informal carers against care recipients or their estates (McFarlane 2014). 
An estoppel claim arises where: 
 Th e owner of land [or other property], A, in some way leads or allows the claimant, B, 
to believe that he has or can expect some kind of right or interest over A ’ s [property]. 
To A ’ s knowledge, B acts to his detriment in that belief. A then refuses B the anticipated 
right or interest in circumstances that make that refusal unconscionable (HM Land 
Registry and Law Commission: [5.29]). 
 Lord Walker (2008: 234) has said that  ‘ [i]n modern authorities the [estoppel] 
 claimant ’ s case is usually founded  … on [his] personal assistance to the defendant ’, 
and there have been a number of successful estoppel claims involving informal 
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  19  On the advantages of the statutory approach of the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 
in New Zealand, see, eg, Sloan (2013:  ch 3 ). 
  20  cf Sloan (2013:  ch 8 ). 
  21  cf , eg, Havelock (2016). 
  22  cf the antiquated cases on the provision of urgent medical treatment for  ‘ paupers ’, eg,  Lamb v Bunce 
( 1815 )  4 M  & S 275 , (1815) 105 ER 836 (KB). 
  23  Banque Financi è re de la Cit é v Parc (Battersea) Ltd [ 1999 ]  1 AC 221 (HL), 227 (Lord Steyn). 
 cf Investment Trust Companies (In Liquidation) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [ 2012 ] 
 EWHC 458 (Ch);  cf Birks (2005) on  ‘ absence of basis ’ as the justifi cation for an unjust enrichment 
claim. For a discussion of possible defences to an unjust enrichment claim, see, eg, Mitchell, Mitchell 
and Watterson (2016: part 6). 
  24  See, eg,  Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [ 2006 ]  UKHL 49 [21] 
(Lord Hoff mann). 
  25  For a devastating critique of the language of  ‘ risk-taking ’ in the law of unjust enrichment, see 
Wilmot-Smith (2011). 
carers (Sloan 2013:  chapter 2 ). Claims are oft en brought aft er the death of the 
representor, for example on the basis that the care recipient promised to leave 
property to the claimant in a will but failed (whether accidentally or deliberately) 
to do so. 
 Proprietary estoppel is controversial because of uncertainties surrounding 
its requirements, and because it circumvents the usual restrictions placed upon 
a valid contract, a valid disposition of an interest in land and a valid will (ibid; 
Dixon 2010). 19 It is nevertheless well-established, and does provide a remedy for 
some carers. Th at said, the doctrine is limited to the enforcement of promises or 
expectations somehow generated by the care recipient. 20 
 It might be assumed that a remedy could readily be sought by an informal carer 
on the basis that the care recipient was unjustly enriched by the services provided 
(Nield 2007). Even so, the possibility of using the principles of unjust enrich-
ment to claim a remedy for caring or other domestic services, such as a quantum 
meruit calculated according to their reasonable value, 21 remains controversial in 
England (Sloan 2013:  chapter 4 ). 22 It is relatively well-established that, in England, 
a successful unjust enrichment claim involves the enrichment of the defendant at 
the expense of the claimant in particular circumstances rendering the enrichment 
unjust and where there are no defences. 23 
 Even if it can be shown that the care recipient was enriched at his expense 
(Sloan 2013:  chapter 4 ), the claimant carer must still identify the relevant unjust 
factor through which restitution of unjust enrichment can be sought. 24 Th is is not 
an easy task, and Wells (2007: 69) argues that that  ‘ the courts have not always 
scrupled to identify the unjust factor present in more recent quantum meruit 
cases ’. Several factors could be relevant (Sloan 2013: 124 – 28), but a fundamen-
tal diffi  culty faced by the carer who seeks a remedy is that in many situations he 
can plausibly be described as a  ‘ domestic risk-taker ’ (Mee 2009: 374). 25 In other 
words, it could oft en be said that he voluntarily assumed caring responsibilities 
without entering a contract, and  ‘ gambled ’ (Burrows 1988) on the care recipient ’ s 
128 Brian Sloan
  26  See also, eg,  Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v Inland Revenue Commissioners [ 2006 ]  UKHL 49 , at 
[25] – [27] (Lord Hoff mann). 
  27  Walsh v Singh [ 2009 ]  EWHC 3219 (Ch). 
  28  ibid [67]. 
  29  Re Coventry (decd) [ 1980 ]  Ch 461, 474 (Oliver J). 
  30  Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, original s 1(3); see, eg,  Re Wilkinson 
(deceased) [1978] Fam 22. 
  31  Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(3), as amended by the  Inheritance 
and Trustees ’ Powers Act 2014. 
  32  Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1)(c). 
  33  Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(1)(d). 
  34  cf Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s 1(2)(a)-(aa). 
willingness to pay for his services aft er the event. Virgo (2015: 36 – 37) considers it 
a fundamental principle that where a claimant has acted offi  ciously in transferring 
a benefi t, the law of unjust enrichment will not come to his aid. 26 
 It can be concluded that a carer is likely to encounter diffi  culty in utilising the 
English law of unjust enrichment at present.  Walsh v Singh , 27 a case involving the 
property and business aff airs of former fi anc é s, could be illustrative of the current 
attitude of the English judiciary to the use of unjust enrichment in the domestic 
context. Without discussing particular unjust factors, Judge Purle QC expressed 
concern that 
 [i]f dashed expectations of a long-term domestic relationship open the door to unjust 
enrichment claims, a wide range of claims which the concept of unjust enrichment was 
never meant, and is ill equipped, to deal with will come marching through ’. 28 
 It may be possible to distinguish care cases from  Walsh v Singh , but it is conceiv-
able that Judge Purle QC ’ s more general statement will become infl uential. 
 Succession law is a possible basis of claim for an informal carer, although the 
basic principle of English succession law is that that  ‘ an Englishman still remains 
at liberty at his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases ’. 29 
No family member or carer of any sort has an inherent right to provision from 
an estate. Th at said, the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) 
Act 1975 allows certain people to seek discretionary provision out of the estate 
(Sloan 2017a:  chapter 9 ). One such category (in section 1(1)(e) of the Act) is a 
person who was maintained by the deceased, even if he did not have another famil-
ial or conjugal relationship with the deceased. Early section 1(1)(e) case law was 
prejudicial to carers because care was considered  ‘ full valuable consideration ’ for 
the carer ’ s maintenance, which eliminated the claim. 30 While amendments to the 
Act now make clear that  ‘ full valuable consideration ’ applies only to arrangements 
of a commercial nature, 31 the category is inherently premised on a requirement 
that the  deceased (care recipient in our context) maintained the  claimant (carer) 
rather than the other way around. 
 Adult children 32 and people whom the deceased treated as a  ‘ child of the 
family ’ notwithstanding they were not legal children of the deceased 33 are also 
included among the categories of applicant, albeit that (in common with those 
who are not spouses or civil partners of the deceased) 34 they must show that  ‘ the 
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disposition of the deceased ’ s estate eff ected by his will or the law relating to intes-
tacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable 
fi nancial provision ’ for the applicant ’ s  maintenance . 35 In deciding both whether 
this is the case and what provision should be made, the court will take into account 
a wide range of factors. 36 
 Of course, many carers will be able to demonstrate a relevant need for 
maintenance that might justify provision from the former care recipient ’ s estate, 37 
and one of the strongest justifi cations for a private law remedy is that the carer will 
have suff ered disadvantages generating such a need (Sloan 2013:  chapter 5 ). Th e 
leading case on the 1975 Act, however, is the Supreme Court ’ s recent decision is 
 Ilott v Th e Blue Cross . 38 It involved a claim by a daughter who had been  estranged 
from her mother for some 26 years before the mother ’ s death. Th e daughter and 
her family were dependent on state benefi ts, but had her substantial award reduced 
back to  £ 50,000 by the Supreme Court. Signifi cantly, Lord Hughes contrasted the 
facts of the current case with a hypothetical one involving a 
 claimant  … child of the deceased who had remained exceptionally and confi dentially 
close to her mother throughout, had supported and nurtured her in her old age at some 
cost in time and money to herself, and  … had been promised many times that she 
would be looked aft er in the will. 39 
 While  ‘ adhering to the concept of maintenance ’, he opined that  ‘ a judge ought in 
such circumstances to attach importance to the closeness of the relationship in 
arriving at his assessment of what reasonable fi nancial provision requires ’. 40 Th at 
said, he was also anxious that  ‘ care must be taken to avoid making awards under 
the 1975 Act primarily rewards for good behaviour on the part of the claimant or 
penalties for bad on the part of the deceased ’. 41 Th e requirement to show a need 
for maintenance inevitably means that some carers will be unable to secure any 
provision even if they fall within an eligible category of applicant. 
 Given that English Law is already content to interfere with testamentary 
freedom for several reasons and for a wide range of applicants (Herring 2016a), 
reform in this area should be seriously considered. 
 In contrast to the wide range of applicants who can claim statutory property 
or fi nancial provision from an estate, only (at least purported or former) spouses 
(who can be any combination of genders) 42 or same-sex civil partners, 43 and 
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usually minor children (or at least those still in education) 44 can claim similar 
provision while the defendant is still alive (Sloan 2013:  chapter 6 ). As might be 
expected, those within the prohibited degrees of relationship (including parents 
and children) are prevented from entering a valid marriage or civil partnership, 45 
notwithstanding the attempt to remove the degrees from the Civil Partnership Bill 
as it passed through Parliament (Glennon 2005). 46 Moreover, child support plays 
a very limited role once the child in question reaches 18 (Masson, Bailey-Harris 
and Probert 2008: [15-032]). Th e prospects for a caring adult child bringing a 
successful  inter vivos statutory claim are therefore very slight and they are essen-
tially non-existent for other non-spouses/civil partners. It should be noted that 
even conjugal cohabitants are denied such a statutory claim in their own right 
(Sloan 2015a), and changing this may well be seen as a priority (Law Commission 
2002 and 2006). 
 Th e focus on conjugality and countervailing failure to prioritise care per se 
in English family law has been criticised (Herring 2013:  chapter 6 ), and is not 
consistent with all other jurisdictions (including in Australia, as will be seen in the 
next sub-section). Th at said, statutory  inter vivos claims by carers may not refl ect 
public expectations (Peart 2008), 47 and bring additional diffi  culties as compared 
to succession-based claims in light of the care recipient ’ s continued need of her 
property and the awkwardness that such a claim might cause within a caring rela-
tionship (Sloan 2013: 138 – 39). Th e recognition of caring relationships in Australia 
ought now to be considered. 
 B. Australia 
 As in England, despite the availability of social care, informal carers play a vital 
role in Australia. It has been said that  ‘ [m]ost aged care is informal, provided by 
families, friends, communities and volunteers ’ (Tune 2017: 6), and one study found 
that 92 per cent of  ‘ people living in their own homes with severe or profound 
limitations in core activities receive informal care ’, with  ‘ [t]hirty-eight percent 
receiv[ing] only informal assistance and 54 percent receiv[ing] a combination of 
informal and formal assistance ’ (Glover). Conversely,  ‘ [a]pproximately 2.3 million 
people provide some informal care of the aged ’ and  ‘ [i]n 2009, 12 percent of 
Australians were informal caregivers and around 30 percent of those were the 
primary caregiver [carer] ’. 
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 Public state support for carers is available, for example in the form of the 
 ‘ carer payment ’ and  ‘ carer allowance ’ and covering both children and adults. 48 In 
2011 – 12, the federal government  ‘ provided AUD3.18 billion (USD2.07 billion) 
under the income-tested Carer Payment program, and AUD1.75 billion 
(USD1.14 billion) through the Carer Allowance (not income-tested, and off ered 
as a supplement for daily care) ’ (Glover). Th e Government  ‘ also provides an 
annual Carer Supplement of AUD480 million (USD313 million) to help with the 
cost of caring ’. 
 In a number of Australian States and Territories, however, caring relationships 
are recognised on a similar basis to other adult relationships, such as marital or 
de facto (ie conjugal cohabitational) ones. Th is includes recognition in succes-
sion law (National Committee on Uniform Succession Laws 2004: 7 fn 42), in 
contrast to the piecemeal and non-tailored approach of English Law considered 
above. On Wong ’ s (2009: 53) account, the Australian Capital Territory ’ s Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 was  ‘ the fi rst sub-national legislation to shift  the focus of 
domestic relationships from status to interdependency ’. It was described as  ‘ repre-
senting a movement towards a more fl uid concept of relationships governed by 
redistributive law ’, 49 including non-couple relationships where care and support 
was present. 50 Other Australian States and Territories have similarly gone further 
than England and Wales by specifi cally recognising the relationship between carer 
and care recipient on a basis similar to that between conjugal couples (married or 
unmarried). 51 
 Th e New South Wales concept of a  ‘ close personal relationship ’, introduced 
in 1999 52 and now governed by the Succession Act 2006 in the succession law 
context, 53 would provide something of a solution to the problems currently faced 
by carers under the English 1975 Act (and private law in general). It is appar-
ently backward- rather than forward-looking, at least as regards eligibility, 54 which 
means that a  ‘ pure ’ carer without another relationship with the care recipient is 
nevertheless likely to fall within the parameters of the category based on what he 
has done for the deceased in the past. 
 A  ‘ close personal relationship ’ exists 
 between two adult persons [who are not in a marriage or de facto relationship with each 
other], whether or not related by family, who are living together, one or each of whom 
provides the other with domestic support and personal care. 55 
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 A claim is precluded, however, if the domestic support or personal care is 
provided  ‘ for fee or reward ’ or  ‘ on behalf of another person or an organisation 
(including a government or government agency, a body corporate or a charitable 
or benevolent organisation) ’. 56 Th e  ‘ close personal relationship ’ must exist at the 
time of death. 
 One restriction in the amended Succession Act 2006 is that applicants who 
invoke the  ‘ close personal relationship ’ provision are not eligible as of right, and 
must convince the court that  ‘ having regard to all the circumstances of the case 
(whether past or present) there are factors which warrant the making of the 
application ’. 57 In relation to other claimant categories, the courts require  ‘ good and 
suffi  cient grounds for the application ’. 58 A signifi cant amount of care should consti-
tute a factor warranting the application, not least because it has been allowed to do 
so in applications by dependants. 59 Signifi cantly, in  Estate MPS , there were said to 
be  ‘ factors warranting ’ an application despite the fact that the  ‘ care ’ provided was 
held to be  ‘ inappropriate and inadequate ’, 60 which arguably raises issues concern-
ing what might be called the  ‘ dark side ’ of care. 
 Interestingly, the court is permitted to have regard to the same list of factors 
when determining whether an applicant is an eligible person as when it is exer-
cising its discretion on determining the relief to be granted. 61 Th is discretionary 
approach appears open-ended. 62 
 Th e  ‘ close personal relationship ’ is composed of a number of elements. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the deceased and the applicant must have been 
 ‘ living together ’, in  Hayes v Marquis the Court of Appeal of New South Wales has 
accepted that the parties to a close personal relationship do not have to do so on 
a full-time basis. 63 McColl JA suggested that the common residence requirement 
might be  ‘ somewhat more attenuated ’ for the purposes of a close personal rela-
tionship than for a de facto relationship between cohabitants. 64 Th is is signifi cant, 
since it is not strictly necessary even for de facto partners to share a household 
to qualify for provision in New South Wales. Th at said, Einstein J considered it 
important that the parties regard the place they live together as  ‘ their home ’, even 
if family or work commitments sometimes required them to leave it. 65 Moreover, 
the  ‘ domestic support ’ requirement was said to underline the notion of a shared 
household. 66 
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 In  Dridi v Filmore , it was confi rmed that the domestic support and personal 
care requirements were cumulative, increasing the sense in which the legisla-
tion recognises care per se. 67 Th ere is, however, an inevitable overlap between the 
concepts. In  Hayes , the phrase  ‘ domestic support ’ was not held to  ‘ occasion any 
particular questions of ambiguity ’. 68 Th e Attorney General, in the debates leading 
to the passing of the 1999 reforms, opined that such support consisted of  ‘ attend-
ing to the household shopping, cleaning, laundry and like activities ’. 69 
 Th e  ‘ personal care ’ requirement, crucial for present purposes, has been a 
source of greater diffi  culty. Th e Supreme Court of New South Wales originally 
interpreted  ‘ personal care ’ to mean  ‘ assistance with mobility, personal hygiene and 
physical comfort ’, with the result that emotional support in itself was insuffi  cient. 70 
Th e eff ect of this, according to Graycar and Millbank (2007: 149), was to turn the 
concept into  ‘ one addressing only (unpaid) live-in caregivers ’. Th e Law Reform 
Commission (2006: [3.10]) proclaimed that:  ‘ Th e  “ personal care ” element is not 
easy to satisfy. ’ In one case, the performance of housework and the transporting 
of the deceased to medical appointments was not suffi  cient to constitute  ‘ personal 
care ’. 71 In another,  ‘ [t]he fact that the appellant provided  … support for weekly 
periods over  … 15 months did not constitute the relationship as one that involved 
the closeness or intimacy necessary for a close personal relationship ’. 72 It is clear 
that a certain amount of domestic support and care is needed before the statute is 
engaged. In the opinion of McColl JA in  Hayes ,  ‘ if two adults lived together full-
time and one provided domestic support and personal care to the other only once 
or twice a year, it would be diffi  cult to say that a close personal relationship had 
been established ’. 73 
 A carer who provides a signifi cant level of care is unlikely to have any diffi  -
culty in satisfying the  ‘ domestic support ’ and  ‘ personal care ’ criteria provided he 
can demonstrate a suffi  ciently shared household. Moreover, the courts have shown 
themselves to be willing to infer that care has taken place. 74 
 Th e Succession Act 2006 (taking up the mantle of the previous Family Provi-
sion Act 1982) is an important example of how family provision law can specifi cally 
address scenarios involving care in order to provide a remedy for informal carers. 
Nevertheless, although the category apparently prevents a gap in the legislation, 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (2006) reports that few cases have 
been brought by people in  ‘ close personal relationships ’ and that such claims tend 
to be presented as falling within another category. Th is would not, however, detract 
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from the justice served by such a provision if it were introduced in England. Th is is 
particularly true given the problems caused by the  ‘ maintenance ’ point associated 
with dependency discussed above, and by the focus on conjugality and living in 
the same household in the case of cohabitants. In the previous edition of his book, 
Kerridge (2009: [8 – 79]) hints at the possible need to recognise carers specifi cally 
when he argues that a cohabitant of the deceased is in a privileged position as 
compared to a sibling who provides care, although he points out that such a sibling 
will oft en be provided for under the intestacy rules. 
 In the New South Wales context, the  ‘ close personal relationship ’ category 
has sometimes proved vital in cases where an applicant has been unable to bring 
himself within one of the other categories, and it has been said it is not possible 
for the same two people to be in both a de facto relationship and a  ‘ close personal 
relationship ’ simultaneously. 75 In  Hughes v Charlton , for example,  ‘ the evidence 
point[ed] to the [applicant] being a housekeeper for the deceased ’, and the appli-
cant was therefore eligible only as a result of the  ‘ close personal relationship ’ 
category. 76 Admittedly, diffi  cult defi nitional problems would have to be addressed, 
as illustrated by the New South Wales experience itself (Head 2011). Nevertheless, 
that is an inevitable feature of discretionary schemes regulating informal relation-
ships and should not preclude an attempt at reform in England. 
 On a more principled level, the advent of a  ‘ carer ’ category in England could 
be met with the objection that it would eff ectively introduce almost diametrically 
opposite categories of applicant into the 1975 Act. Th is allegation is justifi ed to 
an extent, since one category would be based on the fact that the applicant was 
dependent on the deceased, and another is eff ectively based on the fact that the 
 deceased was dependent on the  applicant (albeit in a diff erent sense). Nevertheless, 
the New South Wales legislature was apparently content to place both categories 
in its Act. It is worth noting that in the case of  ‘ close personal relationships ’ the 
care recipient is equally eligible to bring a claim on the estate of the carer. 77 Th is 
refl ects the reality of interdependence that is oft en present between the parties to 
such relationships, and Herring (2007) points out that it can be diffi  cult to deter-
mine which party is the carer and which the care recipient. 78 Th e categories of the 
dependant and the party to a close personal relationship may be more consistent 
with each other than they fi rst appear. 
 Moreover, given the repugnance expressed by some commentators about the 
idea that a slothful individual is more likely to succeed under the 1975 Act than an 
industrious one, the introduction of an opposing category could nevertheless be a 
positive development. 
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 A  ‘ carer ’ category could also shift  the emphasis away from maintenance and 
future need. Since there is not always a direct connection between work done 
in the past and the present need for maintenance, the new category could be 
more about remuneration. Th is echoes the emphasis on desert present in some 
of  Fineman ’ s (2004) writings. 79 If the sole aim of statutory family provision is to 
allow the continuation of maintenance, a new category is not necessarily consist-
ent with it. On the other hand, if the aim of such statutes could be reformulated 
as the encouragement and fostering of domestic support in general, a  ‘ carer ’ cate-
gory would simply extend this aim to include the provision of such support before 
death. 
 Unfortunately, the English Law Commission (2011: [6.92]) purposely rejected 
the inclusion of carers as a specifi c category of family provision applicant in their 
recent report on intestacy and family provision. It argued that outside cases of 
carers who were maintained by the deceased (who would be able to apply under 
the existing legislation), there are diffi  culties in  ‘ identifying precisely who was to 
benefi t and why ’. Examples of problems given by the Commission are the level of 
care required (and how much entitlement it would bring), and the correct approach 
where another family member or friend was prevented from caring by the appli-
cant. Th ese are signifi cant issues, but it is not clear that the relevant amount of 
care is any more diffi  cult a question than the extent to which the deceased main-
tained an applicant or treated him as a child of the family (already crucial aspects 
of English family provision law). Moreover, the quantum of provision is separated 
from eligibility throughout the rest of the Act, and it is surprising that the Law 
Commission confl ated the two matters as regards carers. Given that New South 
Wales and other jurisdictions have found methods of including carers within 
family provision, it is regrettable that the Commission did not explicitly adopt a 
comparative approach when swift ly rejecting the specifi c inclusion of carers. 
 As well as bringing a family provision claim, parties to  ‘ close personal rela-
tionships ’ in New South Wales can secure orders to redistribute property if the 
relationship breaks down while both parties are still alive. 80 In spite of these 
 inter vivos remedies, according to the Law Reform Commission (2006: [3.22]), 
 [i]n most cases, such relationships are likely to end with the death of the person being 
cared for, in which case the person who has taken care of the other may have recourse 
against the estate if they feel they were not adequately provided for. 
 Hayes v Marquis involved an  inter vivos claim in which the parties were held to be 
in a  ‘ close personal relationship ’. Nevertheless, it is signifi cant that the relationship 
later met the criteria for a  ‘ de facto ’ relationship. 81 
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 Th e apparent rarity of  inter vivos claims in genuine care situations, even where 
such claims are possible, adds weight to the appropriateness of family provision 
law in providing a remedy for the carer. Th e specifi c advantages of succession law 
cannot be applied to  inter vivos provision, not least because the care recipient still 
has need of her property and the parties do not necessarily expect their property 
to be regulated in such a way while they are still alive. An approach based on 
family provision is therefore a preferable remedy, even if an  inter vivos solution 
has the potential advantage of remedying the detriment suff ered by the carer at 
an earlier stage. 
 Th e Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania) provides an alternative model with 
its concept of  ‘ caring relationships ’. 82 Th ese are defi ned using similar terms to 
the New South Wales  ‘ close personal relationships ’, but with a non-exhaustive 
 checklist to aid in determining whether a  ‘ caring relationship ’ exists. 83 Th e Act 
similarly enables those in caring relationships to apply for property adjustment 
and maintenance on the breakdown of their relationships. 84 
 Caring relationships can be registered in Tasmania. 85 Registration is conclu-
sive as regards the existence of the relationship, 86 eliminating the need to resort 
to the checklist. Th e registration of a relationship also permits access to a wider 
range of benefi ts than if it is unregistered, and still more benefi ts remain reserved 
for registered couples in a conjugal relationship (Graycar and Millbank 2007). 
 Independent legal advice is required before registration can occur, 87 and it must 
relate to both  ‘ the eff ect of the registration  … on the rights of the parties ’ 88 and 
 ‘ the advantages and disadvantages, at the time that the advice was provided, to the 
party of registering a deed of relationship ’. 89 A considerable limitation is that the 
parties will not be able to register unless each of them can declare that he/she is 
unmarried and not a party to a  ‘ signifi cant ’ (ie de facto conjugal) relationship or 
another  ‘ caring ’ relationship, whether registered or unregistered. 90 
 In the fi rst three years of the operation of the Tasmanian Act, no  ‘ caring 
relationships ’ were registered (Graycar and Millbank 2007), and although 
Rundle (2011) records four such registrations by 2011, the Tasmanian registry 
of births, marriages and deaths reported no more by October 2017. 91 Graycar 
and Millbank (2007: 150 – 53) suggest that the limited take-up could indicate 
the redundancy of the provisions, and claim that there is  ‘ no empirical evidence 
to demonstrate an unmet legal need for any broadly-based recognition of 
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non-couple relationships ’. On the other hand, they also admit that lack of public 
information could be a factor, and many of the general problems with opt-in 
schemes for unmarried cohabitants are likely to apply in this context (Law 
Commission 2007; Scherpe 2005) alongside the inherent informality of large 
numbers of caring relationships. 
 Th e Tasmanian experience did not prevent Victoria from enacting a  similar 
registration scheme in 2009. 92 New South Wales, on the other hand, appears to 
have excluded  ‘ close personal relationships ’ from its registration scheme for 
couples 93 in spite of the Law Reform Commission ’ s (2006) recommendations. 
 In any case, exclusive registration-based schemes for the recognition of 
carer relationships compound the general diffi  culties with  inter vivos remedies 
(Sloan 2013: section 5.2; Glennon 2005: 144 – 45). 94 It may therefore be the case 
that recognition for particular purposes, such as family provision law, is preferable. 
Whatever the particular model adopted, it seems tolerably clear that the recogni-
tion of care in private law is much more rational and tailored in Australia than it 
is in England. 
 IV. Synthesis and Conclusion 
 Th is chapter has sought to consider the recognition and funding of formal care 
(broadly associated with the public sphere) and informal care (broadly associ-
ated with the private sphere) in England and Australia. It is noteworthy that both 
England and Australia have considered a capping process on formal care (albeit 
that the process is apparently complete in Australia but remains controversial 
there and has a particularly uncertain future in England as of September 2018), 
but that New South Wales (for example) is much more rational in its recognition 
of caring relationships, and that this was the case long before the capping process 
undertaken in the 2013 Act. 
 Th e scope for any successful private law claim could be increased by the 
needs as well as resources of a care recipient in a manner that I have suggested 
is  undesirable in the case of formal care. Th at said, a distinction could 
perhaps be made with regard to informal care where it concerns a genuine 
caring  relationship , whereby care is not merely a service provided by the state 
(funded by the  anonymous taxpayer) to an individual but part of the ubiqui-
tous exchanges involved in everyday life. Th e argument might run that if we 
are content to mandate transfers between private individuals consequent on 
relationships, particularly where one of the parties has died, care would be an 
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appropriate principle upon which to base such transfers (Sloan 2013). Th is 
would fi t with Herring ’ s (2013; also  Chapter nine this volume) advocacy of a 
relational approach to care. It could also be said that the mere fact that liability 
to pay for formal care might be  limited does not mean that there should be no 
liability to pay for it at all, and that appropriating the unpaid labour of a devoted 
carer is not always a legitimate means of avoiding paying for one ’ s care. Th at 
said, it is important that private transfers of property are not seen as an excuse 
for the state to abdicate its responsibilities to address the conundrum of care and 
provide adequately for the needs of its citizens (Sloan 2015). 
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